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Abstract 
This paper presents a novel concept for designing an efficient security solution that can protect wireless ad hoc networks from
heterogeneous attacks. This proposed Secure Routing Protocol against Heterogeneous Attacks (SRPAHA) protocol effectively 
detects and defends the collaborative malicious node without the need of expensive signatures. Finally, this methods had been 
validated through numerous simulation scenarios that synthetically generates the  data sets and verifies using various parameters
such as Route Acquisition Time, Throughput (or packet delivery ratio), Routing Overhead and Average End-to-End 
Delay.Moreover, the results of this work provide better performances as compared to existing security schemes in-terms of 
security, less communication overhead. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICECCS 2015. 
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1. Introduction 
In today’s computing world, with the advancement of wireless technology, mobile communication2 has found its 
way to improve the living standard of our daily life. The rapidly growing of these technologies permits the users to 
access the information and service at anytime and anywhere, in spite of their geographic location. These advantages 
paved the way to resolve the issues such as efficiency, ease to use, and high deployment cost over conventional 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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wired networks. Due to the diversity of applications, there is a necessity and growing interest of future wireless 
networks that need to be formed very quickly, almost spontaneously, decentralized Infrastructure, and dynamic 
network architecture that has led to the development of wireless ad hoc networks. The ad hoc networks are suitable, 
where existing fixed infrastructure is too expensive or inconvenient to employ for applications especially that are 
needed by governments, Law enforcement, Emergency scenarios, Military services, Commercial and Civil 
Applications and vehicular communications etc. Many wireless adhoc network applications require various routing 
protocols that need to operate properly even in hostile environments. As exchanging information between the mobile 
nodes over unprotected wireless links which are particularly vulnerable to different attacks3,15. Already a lot of work 
has been carried out on these networks to defend several existing routing protocols using conventional symmetric 
and asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms such as DES, RSA, ECC, etc. However, these mechanisms achieved 
very high level of security. Nevertheless, require complex factorization of large prime numbers4,5 and addressing of 
the elliptic curve problem. A lot of investigation is still required to find a proper solution for these issues. The 
deployment of security in these routing protocols of wireless adhoc networks is still in their infancy with many 
security problems that are unsolved. Hence, security becomes a critical issue and poses new challenges for designing 
specialized security solutions of these networks. This paper presents efficient, lightweight cryptographic algorithms 
to design and analyse the secure routing protocols for providing the security solutions for specialized wireless ad hoc 
networks requiring less communication bandwidth and less memory in comparison with other cryptographic 
systems.The outline for the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section-2 specifies the related work. Section-
3built a heterogeneous attack model against adhoc routing protocols. Section-4 specifies DNA Based Hybrid 
Cryptographic Mechanism. In Section-5 addresses heterogeneous attack detection. Section-6specifies the simulation 
results. Finally, we discuss the conclusion with future work in Section-7 
2. Related Work 
Some of the researchers has already focused on a wide variety of black hole and wormhole attack detection, 
defending and avoiding techniques has been proposed in the literature. This section review some of the security 
attack, which is detrimental against both pro-active and reactive routing protocols.  
In6, Wang et al. proposed a end-to-end detection mechanism that categorizes wormhole attacks. This generic 
mechanism does not rely on neighbor trust, but it relies on end-to-end detection mechanism based on Cell-based 
Open Tunnel Avoidance (COTA). However, this mechanism requires a high storage power and computation, 
because wormhole detection packets are transmitted and the responses are used to compute each node's position and 
velocity. In7, Tsou et al. introduced a reverse tracing technique to detect and prevent the black hole nodes against 
DSR routing protocol. In8  Cheung et al. proposed multiple attacks model and developed a method based on typical 
isolated alerts about attack steps. In9Yang et al.  proposed a signature-based mechanism to detect the collaborative 
attacks. Their technique is based on blind detection techniques, annotated topology information and multicasting. 
Shurmanet. al.10 proposed two different techniques to detect the black hole attack against MANETS. However, their 
solution cannot handle to detect multiple black hole attack.  In11 Yu-Sung et al. proposed a collaborative IDS for 
different sorts of IDSs to work cooperatively. In12 Hussain et al. proposed a collaborative system to detect distributed 
DoS (DDoS) attacks.   
Most of the solutions discussed above are used to detect or avoid either black hole attacks or wormhole attack on 
routing protocols of mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, a novel method is presented based on the AODV protocol 
in which the collaborative nodes are detected based upon the close neighborhood of the range and send the data 
packet with alternate path between source and destination. In addition, this work also defends the heterogeneous 
attack using SRPAHA mechanisms. 
3. Modelling a Heterogeneous Attack against Adhoc Routing Protocols:
This section mainly addresses the Heterogeneous Attack, which may cause more devastating impacts on adhoc 
networks than single and uncoordinated attacks. In general, the heterogeneous attack model was developed to 
investigate the weaknesses of the routing protocols of mobile ad hoc network that exploits the vulnerabilities of 
adhoc environments, which will harm the system and results in a vulnerability assessment. This Heterogeneous 
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of unicasting as in the original AODV routing protocol. To adapt the dynamic topology environment in the route 
discovery process of AODV in ad hoc networks, we used multiple, possibly disjoint, routes/path between source and 
destination. The alternative multiple paths between source and destination can be used for two purpose, first if the 
primary path fails to send the packets to the destination. Second, after detection of heterogeneous attack, source 
node will diverted the traffic with alternate route to the destination. Finally, once the path is entrenched, the nearest 
neighbor nodes will monitor the link status for the active routes. The nodes that do not conformed the neighbor 
rating based on neighbor profile will be eliminated from the route  
4.2 Modelling a DNA Assembled Public Key (DAPK) Cryptography 
A DNA assembled public key encryption scheme17 makes use of asymmetric encryption scheme (We used 
underlying RSA Algorithm for encrypting the plain text message, which is one of the public key cryptosystem.)for 
effective storage of cipher text and public key in the DNA strand.  Moreover, this method, first, it provides double 
encryption, which is very difficult for adversary to break the cryptosystem. Second, it provides more compact 
storage space, which is more suitable for public key encryption. In our case, RSA public keys require huge storage 
for storing large prime numbers. While DNA assembled public key cryptography, take less storage than public 
encryption algorithm 
4.3 Modelling a Pseudo DNA based Symmetric Cryptosystem: 
In1, we proposed a novel method called pseudo symmetric DNA based cryptographic mechanisms. This pseudo 
DNA based symmetric cryptography mechanism is mainly used to achieve data integrity and confidentiality.  
4.4 Node Authentication using Hybrid DNA based Cryptosystem: 
This section describes the hybrid DNA based cryptosystem, which is used to verify the data integrity and 
authenticate the mobile nodes. Moreover, this hybrid approach makes use of both the public and private key-based 
schemes. Here, symmetric encryption  will  be  used to achieve integrity and confidentiality, while asymmetric 
encryption  will provide  to  authenticate  the  members  of  mobile nodes. In order to authenticate the mobile nodes 
and to establish the session keys, the following framework is used.  
• Initially, a node ‘S’ generates a pair of DNA secret key K(PR,S)  and public key K(PU,S) and distributed the 
public key K(PU,S) to the node ‘D’ by using Public Key Infrastructure or Trusted Authority.  
• Similarly, a node ‘D’ also generates a  pair of DNA private key K(PR,D)  and public key K(PU,D) and 
distributed the DNA public key K(PU,D) to the node ‘S’ by using PKI or CA.  
• If the node ‘S’ and node ‘D’  are 1-hop neighbors then Node ‘S’ can authenticate the node ‘D’ by issuing a 
signed certificate with its DNA private key. Here certificate is a proof of node ‘D’ ID and DNA public key with 
‘S’ signature.  
• If any of the intermediate nodes ‘w' want the read  the  signed certificate, he/she should hold ‘S’ DNA public key 
and then node ‘w’  can read and  trust that node by  bind it along its DNA public key.  
• Finally, N-hop one to one intermediate nodes can quickly create a DNA private key by using three-way 
handshake based on the key information and availability of certificates in the PKI16.
5. Heterogeneous Attack Detection: 
This sub-section performs the next task, after developing the secure route discovery process on the AODV routing 
protocol, the detection scheme against heterogeneous attack,which is incorporated into secure route discovery 
procedures.To detect the cooperative misbehaving nodes, first, the all nearest neighbour and foreign neighbour 
nodes profile approach18 are used. In this approach, each node finds its closest nearest neighbour and foreign 
neighbour between the sender and receiver via neighbour nodes. To be more specific, Let ݊ଵ be the nearest node to 
ǡ ݊ଶ be nearest neighbor node to ଵܺ and foreign neighbor to ݊ଵ and ݊ଷ be nearest neighbor node to ܺଶand it is 
nearest foreign neighbor to ݊ଶ  and so on. Subsequently, all the nearest neighbour and foreign neighbour݊ଵǡ ݊ଶǡ ݊ଷ
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between the sender ‘s’ and receiver ‘d’ will estimate the malicious nodes antiquity by neighbour rating of ܯǡ
ଵܺandܺଶ respectively. All the neighbor node will share the unique DNA based secret shared key between the sender 
and neighbour nodes.The node ݊௜  is the neighbor to M but cannot reach to ଵ  , node ௝݊  is the neighbor to ଵ
completely know the profile of  ଵ but cannot reach to ଶ and node ݊௞ is the neighbor to ଶ completely know the 
profile of  ଶ . since݊௞ is already neighbor to ௝݊ ǡand ௝݊is already neighbor to ݊௜. who completely gives opinion of 
M, ଵandଶto the source node. Subsequently, In a future behavior between M, ଵand ଶ will be monitored by  
݊௜ǡ ௝݊ܽ݊݀݊௞, the probability of this nodes behavior will be rated by both the nodes ݊௜ǡ ௝݊ܽ݊݀݊௞is: 
ܮ݁ݐܦ௑ଵǡଡ଼ଶ ൌ ݈݈ܽݐ݄݁݁݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݁ݎݏሺ݄ܾ݊݁݅݃݋ݎݎܽݐ݅݊݃ሻܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ ଵܺܽ݊݀ܺଶ݅ݏ݉݋݊݅ݐ݋ݎܾ݁݀ݕ݊௞
ܺ௑ଵǡଡ଼ଶሺݕሻ ൌ ݅݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݒܽݎܾ݈݂݅ܽ݁݋ݎ݊݋݀݁݊௞݂݋ݎݐ݄݁ܿ݋݂݊݅ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊݋݂݈݉ܽ݅ܿ݅݋ݑݏ݊݋݀݁ܺଶܽݐ݁݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݁ݎݕ
ߏ൫ ௝ܺǡ௑ଶሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯ȁܦ௝ǡ௞ǡ ܦ௞ǡ௑ଶ
ൌ ߏ൫ ௝ܺǡ௞ሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯หܦ௝ǡ௞  ήǡ ߏ൫ܺ௞ǡ௑ଶሺݕ ൅ ͳሻͳ൯หܦ௞ǡ௑ଶ+                  
ൣͳ െ ߏ൫ ௝ܺǡ௞ሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯ȁܦ௝ǡ௞൧  ڄ  ൣͳ െ ߏ൫ܺ௞ǡ௑ଶሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯ȁܦ௞ǡ௑ଶ൧
ൌ  ݎ௝ǡ௞ݎ௞ǡ௑ଶ ൅൫ͳ െ ݎ௝ǡ௞൯ ڄ ൫ͳ െ ݎ௞ǡ௑ଶ൯  (1) 
ܮ݁ݐܦெǡଡ଼ଵ ൌ ݈݈ܽݐ݄݁݁݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݁ݎݏሺ݄ܾ݊݁݅݃݋ݎݎܽݐ݅݊݃ሻܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܽ݊݀ ଵܺ݅ݏ
݉݋݊݅ݐ݋ݎܾ݁݀ݕ݊௜ܽ݊݀ ௝݊
ܺெǡଡ଼ଵሺݕሻ ൌ ݅݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݒܽݎܾ݈݂݅ܽ݁݋ݎ݊݋݀݁ ௝݂݊݋ݎݐ݄݁ܿ݋݂݊݅ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊݋݂݈݉ܽ݅ܿ݅݋ݑݏ݊݋݀݁ ଵܺܽݐ݁݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݁ݎݕ
ߏ൫ ௜ܺǡ௑ଵሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯ȁܦ௜ǡ௝ǡ ܦ௝ǡ௑ଵ
ൌ ߏ൫ ௜ܺǡ௝ሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯หܦ௜ǡ௝  ήǡ ߏ൫ ௝ܺǡ௑ଵሺݕ ൅ ͳሻͳ൯หܦ௝ǡ௑ଵ+                  
ൣͳ െ ߏ൫ ௜ܺǡ௝ሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯ȁܦ௜ǡ௝൧  ڄ  ൣͳ െ ߏ൫ ௝ܺǡ௑ଵሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯ȁܦ௝ǡ௑ଵ൧
ൌ  ݎ௜ǡ௝ݎ௝ǡ௑ଵ ൅൫ͳ െ ݎ௜ǡ௝൯ ڄ ൫ͳ െ ݎ௝ǡ௑ଵ൯     (2) 
ܮ݁ݐܦ௦ǡ௠ሺݕሻ݈݈ܽݐ݄݁݁݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݁ݎݏሺ݄ܾ݊݁݅݃݋ݎݎܽݐ݅݊݃ሻܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܵܽ݊݀
݅ݏ݉݋݊݅ݐ݋ݎܾ݁݀ݕ݊௜
ܺ௦ǡ௠ሺݕሻ ൌ ݅݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݒܽݎܾ݈݂݅ܽ݁݋ݎ݊݋݀݁݊௜݂݋ݎݐ݄݁ܿ݋݂݊݅ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊݋݂݈݉ܽ݅ܿ݅݋ݑݏ݊݋݀݁ܯܽݐ݁݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݁ݎݕ
ߏ൫ܺ௦ǡ௠ሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯ȁܦ௦ǡ௜ǡ ܦ௜ǡ௠
ൌ ߏ൫ܺ௦ǡ௜ሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯หܦ௦ǡ௜  ήǡ ߏ൫ ௜ܺǡ௠ሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯หܦ௜ǡ௠+
ൣͳ െ ߏ൫ܺ௦ǡ௜ሺݕ ൅ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ൯ȁܦ௦ǡ௜൧  ڄ  ൣͳ െ ߏ൫ ௜ܺǡ௠ሺݕ ൅ ͳሻͳ൯ȁܦ௜ǡ௠൧
ൌ  ݎ௦ǡ௜ݎ௜ǡ௠ ൅൫ͳ െ ݎ௦ǡ௜൯ ڄ ൫ͳ െ ݎ௜ǡ௠൯ (3) 
The interpretation of the equations 1st ,2nd and  3rdgives the probability of݊௜ǡ ௝݊ܽ݊݀݊௞, that agree and approves the 
nodes ǡ ଵ  and ଶ  is misbehaving. Hence, the nearest neighbour and foreign neighbours can identify the 
misbehaving nodes by monitoring the network traffic of its neighbouring nodes. After detecting the collaborative 
malicious node based on both neighbour direct rating and foreign neighbour indirect rating, the source node will 
divert the traffic with different route to the destination. Eventually, the intrusion of collaborative malicious node 
effect to network becomes weaker. Once again, we can conclude that the more paths reduce collaborative malicious 
node intrusion to the network.  In summary, the heterogeneous intrusion can be identified without the need of 
expensive signatures, as these signatures, which can be used to defend the route from end to end. 
6. Simulation Results and Performance Analysis:  
To study the feasibility of our theoretical work, we have implemented and evaluated the SRPAHA method using the 
network simulator [NS2], which is a software program running in Ubuntu-13.04 and conducted a series of 
experiments to evaluate its effectiveness. The experiment results show that this method is more efficient and 
increase the power against heterogeneous attacks. Our simulations are mainly used to compare between SRPAHA 
with AODV routing protocol with and without the presence of malicious nodesand ARAN respectively. To evaluate 
the SRPAHA, we considered various performance metrics such as Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), Average End-to-
End-Delay and routing overhead. As shown in fig-2 and fig-3, the packet delivery fraction of SRPAHA is higher in 
both the 30 and 50 node scenarios. Subsequently, nearly identical to AODV routing protocol at different speeds. 
However, AODV decreases in the presence of heterogeneous attack (one black hole node and one collaborative 
worm hole nodes), which delivers lesser data packets and routing packets to the destination. To be more specific, 
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of SRPAHA and ARAN. In this case, it is observed that SRPAHA has lower latency than ARAN, Since, SRPDHC 
make use of parallel computation that causes less overhead of cryptographic operations than ARAN. In ARAN, 
while processing the control packets, each and every node has to verify the  signature and replace with its own 
digital signature that cause more overhead using conventional cryptography and additional delays at each node. 
Therefore, the End-to-End packet latency increases.The fig-6 and fig-7 depicts the total overhead of SRPAHA in 
comparison with AODV Here, it is observed that SRPHDC gives slight overhead than AODV due to the security 
mechanism in the presence of different numbers of heterogeneous attack. Moreover, SRPAHA make use of 
IDSAHA that can detect the heterogeneous attack based on neighbour rating and remove them from the route. From 
the figure; it is also observed that SRPAHA gives less overhead than ARAN, because SRPHDC uses a light 
weighted cryptographic mechanism.  
7. Conclusion and Discussion  
This paper addressed a scheme for designing an efficient security solution that can protect wireless adhoc networks 
from heterogeneous attacks. Initially, we had modelled and investigated heterogeneous attack that exploits the 
vulnerabilities of the existing AODV routing protocols of wireless ad hoc network. Particularly, the proposed 
SRPAHA protocol establishes cryptographically secure communication among the nodes using Hybrid DNA-based 
Cryptography (HDC). HDC is one of the prospective methodology for sophisticated wireless adhoc network, which 
require less computational power, communication bandwidth and memory in comparison with other cryptographic 
systems. The simulation results of this work to provide better security, less computation overhead and network 
performances as compared to an existing ARAN scheme.  
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